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Abstract 
In the last ten years, economic issues related to currency policy have become the major ongo-
ing dispute between China and the U.S. Especially the U.S. Congress is stridently demanding 
a tougher policy to avert the negative consequences for the U.S. economy of “unfair” Chinese 
policies in the form of a “manipulated currency.” Building on an analytical framework of dis-
course theory (DT)—and furthermore proposing a method for applying DT in empirical re-
search—an investigation of the congressional debates on the Chinese currency shows that 
the question is not a purely economic one, but that it reflects a dislocation of U.S. identity as 
the vanguard of liberal-democratic capitalism. This implicates changes in regard to how 
“liberal” identity in the U.S. is constructed in relation to the role attributed to “illiberal” 
China, which in turn affects the formulation of China policy by the U.S. Congress. 
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1 Introduction1 
Since China entered a phase of ongoing rapid economic growth, one of the most prominent 
topics disputed between the administration and Congress has been the question of proper 
tactics and strategies to shape U.S.–China economic relations. Up until recently, trade rela-
tions were the most frequently discussed issue, but the question of the exchange rate of the 
Chinese yuan is now overshadowing those. At the latest this became evident in light of con-
                                                 
1  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Young Researchers’ Conference “Liberalism: Causing or 
Solving the Crises of Global Governance?” at Goethe University, Frankfurt, in February 2011. The author 
would like to thank the reviewers and commentators. 
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gressional activity in the form of several bills on China since 2005, and particularly during 
the 110th Congress in 2007. The general claim of the three major bills introduced in the 110th 
Congress was that the Chinese currency was “misaligned” or “manipulated,” bringing about 
the call for unilateral and multilateral trade remedies unless China revalued (cf. Xie 2009: 1; 
Hufbauer/Wong/Sheth 2006: ix–13; Hufbauer/Brunel 2007: 2–5.). None of these or any previ-
ous bills was enacted into law, as the U.S. Trade Representative and the president rejected 
them. The topic, however, has prevailed on the agenda and resurges each time the semi-
annual Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies is due, in 
which the treasury secretary must decide whether to label China a country that manipulates 
its currency.2 In March 2010, 130 members of Congress sent a letter to Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner demanding that the administration designate China as a “currency ma-
nipulator,” a legal label that if invoked would invite Congress to enact punitive legislation 
against China. Additionally, a bipartisan group of senators introduced a bill aimed at invok-
ing trade remedies as a consequence (New York Times 2010: 1).3 The report, originally due 
on 15 April, was postponed, apparently due to other political issues on the agenda, such as 
the nuclear policies of Iran and North Korea. By abstaining from public blaming regarding 
the currency matter, the U.S. administration likely wanted to facilitate a Chinese cooperation 
on these issues (cf. Chan 2010: 1).4  
In contrast, the debates in Congress don’t tend to be very “diplomatic.” In testimony in a 
hearing before the House Committee on Ways and Means on China’s exchange rate policy, 
the representative of the National Retail Federation pointed not only to Congress, but to sev-
eral trade unions when criticizing “the descriptions of issues in the U.S.–China trade rela-
tionship in the most reckless, sweeping, facile, and grossly exaggerated terms […]. Indeed, 
from the tone of these and many other statements, one might be led to think that China is re-
sponsible for the loss of every manufacturing job in the United States, is largely to blame for 
the current state of the U.S. economy, and that China’s exchange rate policy is the main rea-
son behind the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China” (Autor 2010: 3-4). In general, the Con-
gress debates rarely reflect contrary or more balanced arguments, as brought forward by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), leading economists and even columnists in the U.S. 
(e.g. Bottelier/Dadush 2010: 1; Morrison/Labonte 2009a: 4–5).  
                                                 
2  The report is required under Sections 3004 and 3005 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury 2009: 1).  
3  For the legal measures and their possible outcomes, see Hufbauer/Brunel 2007: 7; Hufbauer/Wong/Sheth 2006: 
24–26. For an assessment of the value of the yuan, see e.g. Morrison/Labonte 2007; Morrison/Labonte 2009a, 
2009b; Hufbauer/Wong/Sheth 2006; Hufbauer/Brunel 2007. In general, most economists agree on the yuan be-
ing undervalued, but disagree on the consequences for the U.S. economy.  
4  The report was postponed once more in October 2010, and when finally published in February 2011, it in-
cluded a critique of China’s currency policies, but refrained from calling them “manipulation” (cf. Nymalm 
2011). 
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In Congress, not only is China blamed for the whole malaise of the U.S. economy, but in 
this context the question of the success of one of the major political motives behind U.S. trade 
policy is also raised: achieving political liberalization in non-democratic countries through 
freely trading with them. This was a major argument of the administration and those in Con-
gress who campaigned for China’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which led to the decision in September 2000 to grant China Permanent Normal Trade Rela-
tions (PNTR).5  
A closer look at the congressional debates6 concerning the Chinese currency shows that 
the issue is not a purely economic, financial, or legal one, but a reflection of how the rise of 
China on the global scene—though especially viable in economic and financial figures—is 
affecting the United States’ concept and understanding of liberal trade policy, which basically 
since the late 19th/early 20th century has been shaped by what later on was called the “Wilson-
ian triad,” or what in this paper I call the “liberal theory of history” (LTH). The theory states 
that free trade in a capitalist system leads to democracy and therefore to peace, and this evo-
lution is taken to be not only inevitable but also superior to alternative models, like commu-
nism. For a few years, however, especially since the global financial crisis, this idea of an 
“end of history” has again been scrutinized (cf. Fukuyama 1989). Instead, a discussion is cur-
rently ensuing on “the rise of authoritarian regimes,” “authoritarian capitalism,” and “illib-
eral democracy,” generally pointing to Russia and China as possible alternatives to a “liberal 
peace” (see e.g. Rachman 2010; Gat 2007; Žižek 2008; Ramo 2004; Halper 2010).  
Given the preponderant role and position of the U.S. as the advocate of a liberal and lib-
eralizing trade policy, I presume that the question of a challenge to the LTH posed by an eco-
nomically powerful China—that so far doesn’t follow the path from liberal market policy to 
political liberalization—therefore also implies a challenge to the self-image of the U.S. as the 
leading country of the so far most successful economic and political model, which has come 
under certain pressure since the current global crisis.   
In what follows, I will argue that the currency debates exceed matters of monetary, trade, 
and economic policy in a narrow sense and implicate processes of how collective/national 
identities in political and economic terms are constructed. The LTH is challenged because it 
can explain neither “communist” China’s growing economy nor the current disadvantageous 
standing of the U.S., especially in regards to the trade deficit and debt to China. Finally, this 
                                                 
5  PNTR, a status that the U.S. renamed in 1998, is termed Most Favored Nation (MFN) status under WTO legis-
lation (Art. 1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see Dumbaugh 2001: 1). China’s MFN status 
was renewed annually until January 2002, when it became permanent (Morrison 2009: 1).  
6  The sources are provided by the Library of Congress, which has made the whole Congressional Record from 
1989 onwards accessible online. I conducted a search for the phrase “China currency” for members of Con-
gress speaking on all occasions in the Senate and the House of Representatives for the years 2003–2010 (until 
June) for each Congress (108th until 111th). The turnout was 35 documents for the 108th Congress, 54 for the 
109th, 30 for the 110th and 10 for the 111th. Of these, I considered 8 documents from the 108th Congress, 11 
from the 109th, 9 from the 110th and 5 from the 111th to explicitly deal with the Chinese currency. 
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implicates changes regarding how “liberal” identity in the U.S. is constructed in relation to 
the role attributed to “illiberal” China, which in turn effects the formulation of U.S. China 
policy. After outlining the analytical framework and methodological considerations, I will 
briefly elaborate on my understanding of the LTH as a hegemonic discourse and then pro-
ceed with the analysis of the congressional debates on the Chinese currency.  
2 Analytical Framework: Discourse Theory 
The key premise of the so-called Essex School discourse theory (DT) of particular relevance 
for this paper is a non-essentialist conception of any identity that is expressed through a par-
ticular concept of “discourse.”7 It is centered on the understanding of all objects and actions 
as meaningful, their meaning being conferred by historically specific systems of rules (How-
arth/Stavrakakis 2000: 2) or—more distinctively for the theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe—by systems of differences (Laclau 2007: 37). Discourse constructs the world in 
meaning, meaning being conferred primarily through language and never being perma-
nently fixable.8 Different discourses stand for particular ways of representing and under-
standing the world, and different proponents are engaged in a constant struggle to fix the 
meanings according to their own Weltanschauungen. The aim of discourse analysis is to map 
out the processes of how meaning is created and attempted to be fixed, and how some fixa-
tions might become institutionalized in a way that we regard as “normal” in the sense that 
one particular understanding becomes the “natural” perspective (Jørgensen/Phillips 2004: 
37)—in Laclau’s and Mouffe’s words, hegemonic.9 As I will show in what follows, the LTH 
can be conceived of as a hegemonic discourse. 
According to DT, there is no prediscursively constituted subject or identity; rather, iden-
tity is acquired by identification with the subject positions being articulated in discourses. All 
identity—like all meaning—is relational and differential; every identity is constituted within 
a relationship to others that is only temporarily fixable (Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 111). The sub-
ject is something because it is contrasted with something else that it is not, and groups consti-
tute themselves in relation to other groups. The constitution of any identity happens through 
discursive processes, during which identities are accepted, refused, and negotiated. As 
meaning can never be ultimately fixed, the way is open for constant social struggles over 
definitions of society and identity (Jørgensen/Phillips 2004: 24-36).  
With respect to my topic of research, this means that “no state possesses a prediscursive, 
stable identity, and no state is free from the tension between the various domains that need to 
                                                 
7  DT has its main roots in post-Marxist and post-structuralist theories (cf. Howarth 2000: 1–5). 
8  This does not intend to reduce everything to language, or deny the existence of the “real” world (cf. Howarth 
2000: 9). 
9  This includes rendering alternatives to the hegemonic articulation unthinkable (Laclau 1988: 57; Marchart 
1998: 14). For their concept of hegemony, see Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 134–148. 
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be aligned for a political community to come into being, an alignment that is a response to, 
rather than constitutive of, a prior and stable identity” (Campbell 1998: 91). The identity of 
states is discursively constructed through the inscription of limits that serve to distinguish a 
Self from an Other, an inside from an outside, a domestic from a foreign (cf. Campbell 1998: 9). 
In this sense, I understand a state as a product of competing hegemonic struggles seeking to 
impose their projects on society (Howarth 2000: 120). My aim in this paper is to inquire how 
and with what outcomes these hegemonic struggles take place in the United States. 
A hegemonic discourse becomes challenged or dislocated by events that cannot be ex-
plained or integrated by it (Glasze 2007: 661; Torfing 2005: 16), a process that, according to 
my analysis, is currently taking place with respect to U.S. identity constructions in terms of 
the LTH and the discourse on China’s currency policies.  
In case of a dislocation, the Other, or the constitutive outside, is made responsible for it 
(cf. Torfing 2005: 17), resulting in an antagonism that is described by Laclau and Mouffe with 
the logics of equivalence and difference (Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 132; cf. Laclau 1990: 39, 50; Jør-
gensen/Phillips 2004: 59).10 The logic of equivalence creates equivalent identities through the 
negation of other discursive systems—other groups—by subverting the differential character 
within their own discourse or in-group. The internal differences are canceled out by referring 
to an external Other that is fundamentally opposed to everything that constitutes the Self or 
the collective. In consequence, the internal differences become equivalent as being opposed 
to a common external Other, in this case “illiberal” China. The logic of difference does the 
opposite; it expands a given system of differences by dismantling existing relations of 
equivalence and thereby weakening and dissolving antagonisms.11 As I will show, the logics 
of equivalence and difference underlie the congressional debates and the advocacy of par-
ticular policies vis-à-vis China. 
The logics of equivalence and difference function through the creation of so-called empty 
signifiers as signifiers of lack. Being “empty,” they provide a common point of reference – a 
nodal point – or equivalent identification for different positions. Laclau gives the notion of 
“order” in a situation of disorder as an example, “order” as such not having any content be-
cause of its sheer existence in its various forms of actual realization. In a situation of disorder, 
“order” becomes an empty signifier as it signifies its own absence. In my case, the notion of 
“fairness” functions as the empty signifier. When an empty signifier becomes a signifier of a 
lack, various proponents—for example, members of Congress—can compete in order to es-
tablish their particular concept to abolish or deal with the lack. To exercise the filling of the 
                                                 
10  However, Laclau points out that no dislocation needs to be constructed in an antagonistic way, meaning that 
there are no “natural” antagonisms (Laclau 2009: 319 with reference to Stäheli 2009: 239; see also Norval 2000: 
223). 
11  These two logics are not mutually exclusive, but like between identity and difference, there is always interplay 
between them, as the in-group strives to construct itself in non-antagonistic terms (cf. Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 
130; Howarth/Stavrakakis 2000: 11).  
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empty signifier is when the discourse becomes hegemonic, when a particular proponent or 
group succeeds in establishing its objectives as that of the whole collective (cf. Laclau 2007: 
44). This goes hand in hand with articulating the “excluded Other” as responsible for the 
lack.  
2.1 Methodological Approach: Discourse Analysis and Political Rhetoric 
As the approach of Laclau and Mouffe does not consider methodological proceedings (cf. 
Jørgensen/Phillips 2004: 24; Howarth 2005: 316–347), my aim in this paper is to enhance their 
approach by drawing from a method for the analysis of political rhetoric. Rhetoric is the 
practical science and art of effective or efficient speaking and writing in public or, more spe-
cifically, the science and art of persuasive language use, the three crucial objectives of such 
persuasion being logos, ethos and pathos. Persuasion connected with logos uses sound ar-
gumentation like factual information, whereas ethos and pathos draw from non-
argumentative means like emotionalization, suggestion, demagogy, propaganda, the use of 
threats, etc. Rhetorical analysis then intends to analyze the employment and effects of lin-
guistic and other semiotic means of persuasion in rhetorical terms. Political rhetoric in this 
context refers to the use of rhetorical means of persuasion by professional politicians (Reisigl 
2008: 97). Laclau mentions the central role of rhetoric in the structuration of any signifying 
system (cf. Laclau 2009: 325), and states that rhetoric should be a privileged field of inquiry 
“if we are searching for a terrain in which the subversion of identities resulting from antago-
nistic relations could be represented” (Laclau 2006: 106). He also speaks of the social organ-
ized as a rhetorical space (Laclau 2000: 79).  
In order to propose a method for applying DT in empirical analysis, I intended to capture 
the key concepts and terms through a rhetorical analysis that focused on nomination (nam-
ing of actors), predication (attribution of features), argumentation (justification/delegiti-
mization of nomination and predication), perspectivation (point of view of expression), and 
finally intensification and/or mitigation as analytic categories (cf. Reisigl 2008: 99).12 To my 
understanding, within the logics of equivalence and difference, the Self and the Other are 
constituted through articulating them in a certain way, and this happens via nomination and 
predication. To link these characterizations to chains of equivalence, the speakers use argu-
ments to justify the nominations and predications. In order to differentiate the in-group from 
the out-group—the Self from the Other—the speakers articulate themselves from a certain 
perspective, thus they relate themselves to a nodal point that functions as the empty signifier. 
                                                 
12  These are the analytic categories that Martin Reisigl proposes as heuristic devices for his so-called “politico-
linguistic” approach to the analysis of political rhetoric. Reisigl is a proponent of the Critical Discourse Analy-
sis (CDA) that differs in important ways from DT regarding its conception of “discourse.” Working with the 
analytic categories does not mean to incorporate the whole approach and its differing premises. On the differ-
ences and the question of possible “combinations” of concepts from DT and CDA, see Jørgensen/Phillips 2004: 
17, 62; Wodak 2008: 5; Fairclough 2003: 88; Chouliaraki 2007: 279; Nabers 2009: 194; Torfing 2005: 9. 
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The empty signifier makes the cancellation of all differences within the in-group possible by 
equalizing its characteristics vis-à-vis the out-group. The intensification of the nominations, 
predications, arguments, and perspective finally endorses the construction of the excluded 
Other.13 
3 The “Liberal Theory of History,” “American Exceptionalism” and U.S. China Policy 
 
By joining the W.T.O., China is not simply agreeing to import more of 
our products. It is agreeing to import one of democracy's most cher-
ished values, economic freedom. The more China liberalizes its econ-
omy, the more fully it will liberate the potential of its people—their ini-
tiative, their imagination, their remarkable spirit of enterprise. And 
when individuals have the power, not just to dream, but to realize their 
dreams, they will demand a greater say (The New York Times 2000: 1). 
 
This idea of economic policy leading to political liberalization—as expressed here by the 
former President Bill Clinton when trying to convince Congress to approve his bill concern-
ing China’s accession to the WTO—can be traced back to President Wilson and the Wilsonian 
triad as the set of peace, democracy, and free markets. What Wilson expressed in his “14 points 
speech” to Congress in January 1918—that free trade along with disarmament and democ-
racy were pillars of a peaceful world—has since then become a major line of U.S. policy, one 
that became firmly rooted after the end of the Second World War and during the Cold War 
(Mandelbaum 2002: 6).  
In the 1970s the idea of a “market society” became the basis for the political-economic 
philosophy of the interconnectedness of economic and political freedoms. The core idea was 
that the power of the market lay in economic freedom, but that it could only exist in the con-
text of political freedom where the individual was free to choose how to live, what to buy, 
and what to produce (Halper 2010: 53). In this context, capitalism was articulated as the only 
type of social organization that respected the principle of individual liberty, as it was seen as 
the only economic system capable of coordinating the activities of a great number of people 
without recourse to coercion (Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 172).  
Laclau and Mouffe described the two decades after the end of the Second World War as 
“neo-capitalist euphoria […] that showed a linear tendency towards a homogenous society in 
which every antagonistic potential would be dissolved, and each collective identity [would 
be] fixed in a system of differences.” In the 1980s they predicted a “crisis of the hegemonic 
formation of the post-war period,” given a variety of different social movements (La-
                                                 
13  In most cases, the analytic categories are not clearly separable; most frequently, the nominations already carry 
a predicative, qualitative meaning, and the perspective is already part of the argument.  
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clau/Mouffe 2001: 158–168). With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War, however, the idea of “liberal peace” or the LTH seemed to have been accurate in its 
predictions, and it acquired what many authors call a hegemonic status in the sense of either 
not being questioned, or being permanently referred to in opposition to it: it provided the 
most widely adopted set of political and economic principles and was practiced by the most 
powerful members of the international system. Accordingly, the expansion of the liberal 
world order is a necessary and inevitable process (Mandelbaum 2002: 26, 326). This convic-
tion was represented most prominently by Francis Fukuyama’s notion of “the end of his-
tory,” by which he meant the end of ideological struggles after the collapse of the main 
communist opponent, leading to “an unabashed victory of economic and political liberal-
ism” (Fukuyama 1989: 3).  
Marchart explicitly denotes Fukuyama’s “end of history” as a hegemonic articulation in 
the Laclauian sense, as its central aim was not to propose a concrete hegemonic enterprise, 
but the crucial message was to render any alternative to liberal-democratic capitalism un-
thinkable (Marchart 1998: 14). 
Krause classifies the U.S. policy described so far as “hegemonic liberalism”—that is, em-
bedded not only in the central role of free trade in the Wilsonian triad, but also in what has 
been widely labeled “American exceptionalism” by other authors (cf. Nabers/Patman 2008: 
170; McEvoy-Levy 2001: 23; Halper 2010: 195; Chen 1992: 7). The “hegemonic liberalists” held 
the view that the liberal agenda of peace, free trade, and democracy could only be achieved 
through hegemony of the U.S. (cf. Krause 2008: 80).14 In this sense, the U.S. saw itself as the 
guarantor of “global public goods” (Parchami 2009: 182) and—according to Anthony Lake, 
the National Security Advisor in 1994—as having a special responsibility to nurture and pro-
mote the “core values of the pursuit of democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets, 
the peaceful settlement of conflict, and the promotion of collective security […] for the sake 
of both its interests and its ideals” (Lampton 2001: 249). The promotion of free trade as a first 
step to political liberalization became an objective of U.S. policy vis-à-vis not only Russia, but 
also China (Mandelbaum 2002: 267).  
With respect to China and its trade relations with the U.S., the LTH was especially 
prominent in the debates and the campaign—organized by the White House under President 
Clinton—on granting China PNTR prior to its accession to the WTO. Clinton’s central argu-
ment besides considering benefits for the American economy was that opening China’s mar-
kets would undermine the control of the communist party (Sanger 2000: 1). This line of ar-
gumentation is still predominantly made use of and referred to by opposing it in the debates 
on the Chinese currency. 
                                                 
14  In this context, the notion of hegemony refers to the theory of hegemonic stability as brought forward within 
the field of international political economy (IPE) from the 1970s onwards. 
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4 The U.S. Congress and the Debates on Chinese Currency 2003–2010 
4.1 “American Self” and “Chinese Other”: Nominations and Predications 
Nominations and predications correspond to the roles ascribed to the “American Self” and to 
the “Chinese Other.” Furthermore, they indicate the major topics of the currency debate. The 
twofold nominations made by the U.S. under some of the topics reflect the impact of what 
Laclau terms “dislocation,” as well as reflecting the differential positions within Congress.  
 
The most frequently voiced nominations and predications are:  
• China the communist dictatorship, communist country, communist system or communist 
regime, in some cases differentiated from “the Chinese people;” 
• China as a non-market economy (the “communist” nomination referring to the political 
form of government, or to society in most of the cases); 
• China as a creditor (“number one purchaser of our debt” or “granddaddy of trade defi-
cits”);  
• China as a competitor;  
• China (more non-specifically) as a foreign country or government; 
• China as an adversary or threat; and 
• under the comprehensive category of intensification, China as the “evil empire.” 
 
On the other side, the U.S. are nominated correspondingly as:  
• us, we or “the American people;”  
• an advocate for free markets; 
• a debtor (“America, which hasn’t had a balanced trade account since 1975”);  
• the “strongest capitalistic country” on the one hand, and “the dump market of the 
world” on the other hand; 
• “our Nation,” “the American people” on the one hand, and “America’s economic elite” 
on the other hand; 
• “our beautiful Nation” vs. “the ones to blame”; and  
• “a great promise” and “the only hope in the world” vs. “second only to the Japanese in 
unpopularity in China.”  
 
Within these topics, some nominations are already intensified through predications. Under 
the topic of “communist China,” this happens through highlighting the “oppressive and ag-
gressive nature of the regime” and the “dictatorial control over politics and business” (C.R. 
2003b: H10068) in “undemocratic” (C.R. 2009a: H2811) or “authoritarian-controlled” China 
(C.R. 2009b: H11104). In many cases, the predications are directly aimed at the Chinese gov-
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ernment as distinguished from “the Chinese people,” such as in expressions like “the clique 
that rules their country” (C.R. 2005b: H11105), “Chinese communist bosses” (C.R. 2010b: 
H1158), and “corrupt dictatorship” (C.R. 2010b: H1159) and more explicitly in “the govern-
ment of China, a specific regime, not the Chinese people themselves” (C.R. 2009b: H11104). 
The Chinese people in contrast are described as “good, decent people […] living under very 
oppressive conditions, something we wouldn’t stand for five minutes” (C.R. 2004b: S5032).  
“We” in opposition to communist China simply means “the Americans” or “the Ameri-
can people,” thus standing in contrast to an inhumane “regime.” I categorized and treated 
the other nominations for both sides as intensifications under the topic of “evil China.”  
Under the topic of China the “non-market economy nation” (C.R. 2005j: H6659), China 
figures as “mercantilist” (C.R. 2003b: H10068) and a “command economy” (C.R. 2003b: 
H10071) being opposed to the U.S. as “believers in free trade” (C.R. 2005c: S3474; C.R. 2004c: 
S8188) not viewing trade as a zero-sum game (C.R. 2005i: S7393).15  
The topic of China as the creditor of the U.S. is clearly an important one, referring to its 
interpretation as “symbol of American decline” (Lighthizer 2010: 1). In an intensified way, 
this is expressed as follows: “Now we are watching major segments of our banking system 
disintegrate […] all while our beautiful Nation begs China, undemocratic China, for money” 
(C.R. 2009a: H2811). Thus China’s role as “[one of] our biggest bankers” (C.R. 2010a: H597) is 
closely linked to being indebted and therefore dependent on a foreign government, which is 
articulated as a threat to national security under the categories of argumentation and per-
spectivation.  
As for the topic of economic competition with China, the latter is seen not only as an eco-
nomic competitor but as a “deadly” one that “is openly hostile to the basic values [that] make 
us Americans” (C.R. 2009b: H11104) and so it becomes—leading to the “threat” topic—an 
“adversary both in economics and […] to our democratic system” (C.R. 2010b: H1159). 
4.2 Currency Manipulation vs. Failed Trade Policy: Argumentation and Perspectivation 
The main line of argumentation throughout the whole debate since 2003 and within all topics 
is that China cheats the system by manipulating its currency. While the term “manipulation” 
already carries a negative connotation—though it is also the legal terminology used in the 
WTO legislation under the GATT (cf. Hufbauer/Brunel 2007: 9)—it is further intensified by 
calling the manipulation “artificial,” “unfair,” or “illegal” as it is said to constitute an “unfair 
subsidy” for all Chinese exports (C.R. 2003b: H10069), to create an “unfair trade advantage” 
over the U.S. and other global competitors (C.R. 2007e: H10197), to “distort the market” (C.R. 
2005i: S7392), and all this for “the purposes of gaining an advantage in foreign markets [, which] 
                                                 
15  At the same time, the notion “non-market economy” also refers to a legal status under WTO rules, as China 
prior to its accession agreed to be recognized as a non-market economy for 15 years by the other members of 
the WTO (Green 2004: 1). 
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violates many of the basic rules of the international monetary system established after 
WWII” (C.R. 2005f: E920).  
The accentuation on China not playing by the rules (C.R. 2005j: H6662) is mostly accom-
panied by the argument of “communist China” that “is not a market economy” (C.R. 2005h: 
E1278), as it was “not willing to make the necessary steps to transition into a market econ-
omy” (C.R. 2004a: S4425), nor “willing to embrace the tenets of free trade” (C.R. 2003b: 
H10065). Not playing by the rules and being unfair are seen as the major factors contributing 
to China’s competitiveness (C.R. 2005h: E1278), implying that if China would adhere to the 
rules, it would be in a completely different position vis-à-vis the U.S.  
As a consequence, the U.S. is depicted as a victim of China’s policies, as “too many com-
panies have been hurt because of unfair Chinese trade practices and China’s fixed currency 
structure” (C.R. 2003b: H10065). “China’s undervalued currency and the U.S. trade deficit 
with the PRC is contributing to significant U.S. job losses and harming U.S. businesses” (C.R. 
2007c: H.R.1002), especially by causing the trade deficit in manufactured goods (C.R. 2005b: 
S1418). As a result, it is claimed that “it is almost entirely the Chinese trade surplus with the 
U.S. that is providing the country with this extraordinary pace of expansion” (C.R. 2005h: 
E1278).  
With respect to its role as a creditor, it is not so often the “China cheats” as the “commu-
nist China” argument that is expressed: “What about Communist China, which routinely 
violates the basic human rights and religious freedom of its own people […]? Do we really 
want China to be our banker? Simply put, we are presently borrowing hundreds of billions 
of dollars from countries which pursue aims that are at odds with our national interest and 
values, both directly and indirectly” (C.R. 2010a: H597).  
These countries are sometimes named: China, Mexico, Japan, “and all the other creditors 
who will be knocking on our grandchildren’s doors” (C.R. 2009a: H2811), sometimes simply 
referred to as “other nations [that] don’t play by the same rules. Other nations manage their 
markets, other nations manipulate their currency. Other nations aren’t democratic and they 
have no rule of law” (C.R. 2009a: H2811). The case of “Communist China, which has lent the 
U.S. nearly a trillion dollars” is seen as particularly severe as “it gains more and more influ-
ence in foreign affairs, literally at our expense” (C.R. 2010c: E432). 
This leads to the other central line of argumentation beneath communist China “the un-
fair player”: questioning the effects and aims of U.S. trade policy with China. Many voices 
speak of a “failed trade policy” and even call for the repeal of PNTR with China (C.R. 2003b: 
H10065) because it has allegedly given “countries such as China, countries that exploit 
sweatshop labor and manipulate their currency, an unfair and unnecessary advantage” (C.R. 
2007b: S1487). In relation to the experience with China, free trade is called “a myth,” a “false 
idol,” and “a wreck” (C.R. 2008a: S761) in some speeches. But also the thought behind it, the 
LTH, is put into question as it has not led to the expected outcomes: “The sweetener [to 
granting China PNTR] was, if we let the one-way free trade keep on, it would bring about 
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world peace, especially peace with China […]. We are going to have a democratizing China 
and world peace if we just continue to allow this one-way free trade policy, which is obvi-
ously not working in the interest of our people” (C.R. 2010b: H1158).  
Under the category of perspectivation, the Congress continues to articulate the U.S. as a 
victim of the unfair Chinese policy, but at the same time their disadvantageous position vis-à-
vis China is also seen from the perspective of possibly having conducted a failed trade policy.  
As for the victim perspective, it is stated that “Americans can compete with any economic 
power in the world, provided there is a level playing field” (C.R. 2003b: H10063). But as 
China is “cheating our economy and stealing our jobs” (C.R. 2005j: H6660) and as “China’s 
idea of fair trade is government subsidies of its textile and apparel exports to the U.S., cur-
rency manipulation, export tax rebates, forgiveness of loans by its government banks, and di-
rect payments to its State-owned textile and apparel industry” (C.R. 2005g: H3588), America 
is the one suffering from the “negative impact” that is “putting millions of hardworking 
Americans out of jobs” (C.R. 2003b: H10064). Therefore it is claimed that China is not an eco-
nomic partner, as it purportedly has “exploited” the U.S. by taking advantage of its situation. 
Thus China is not seen as a partner for peace, nor for world stability. As it still has not re-
formed “its political structure,” it is named “most likely future enemy” or “adversary.” It is 
claimed that without significant political reform in China—meaning a liberalization and a 
recognition of fundamental rights—the “dictatorship will continue in power and grow 
stronger” (C.R. 2009b: H11104).  
The “failed trade policy” argument is explained from the perspective of the LTH, as the 
advocates of a free trade policy with China had “hoped that China would adopt the disci-
plines of the global rules-based trading system” (C.R. 2003b: H10063) as “passage of PNTR 
did, in fact, allow the PRC to move into a rule-based trading system by becoming a member 
of the WTO” (C.R. 2003b: H10066). But it is emphasized that at the moment the vote on 
PNTR took place, there was opposition to granting China that status, but it was outweighed 
by the arguments of those advocating the logics of the LTH: “Those of us who fought MFN 
status and said we’ve got to have some political reform, liberalization before we give such 
enormous economic power to a government, we were just bypassed” (C.R. 2009b: H11105), 
as the argument was that “if we just get involved with them, let’s get involved with these 
people, let’s uplift the economy of the Chinese people, and their government will come 
around [and] bring forces about that will actually liberalize that country” (C.R. 2009b: 
H11105). It was claimed that instead of the U.S. having to lecture them, the Chinese would 
learn by themselves through the benefits of free trade: “Yet instead of being advocates of 
democracy to the Chinese leaders, as we were told would happen, our businesspeople will 
go there and interact with these Chinese leaders and they will become more democratic. 
They will learn to trust us and be more benevolent” (C.R. 2010b: H1159).  
Even those in Congress who in the present debates are not completely taken by the “illib-
eral China” argument are skeptical about the consequences for the U.S. and the whole world: 
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“We should want a growing economy and rising prosperity for the world’s most populous 
nation, but we should question whether the current torrential rate of growth—growth given 
almost entirely by huge net export surpluses with the U.S.—is a positive for the economic 
well-being of our citizens or the prospects for world peace over the coming decades” (C.R. 
2005h: E1278). In this context, China’s “political maturity” to deal with the growth and to 
“use it wisely” is questioned with reference to the missing political liberalization (C.R. 2005h: 
E1278). Both the well-being of the American citizens and the prospects for world peace are 
seen as threatened because of the level of U.S. debt to “illiberal” China. Again, the prevalent 
argumentation is that the huge government debt is due to China’s currency manipulation, as 
it has given China an unfair trade advantage that has caused job losses and the decline of the 
American manufacturing sector, and thus further contributed to the effects of the economic 
crisis. But there is still some blame left for the U.S. itself and its “one-way free trade policy,” 
as can be deduced from statements like: “We fueled their economy, the Chinese economy 
[…]. We’ve let them profit from one-way free trade that has drained our financial resources 
and destroyed our manufacturing base even as we built their manufacturing base” (C.R. 
2009b: H11104) and “one of the major elements that has brought us to this financial crisis has 
been a one-way free trade policy with Communist China” (C.R. 2005b: H11105).  
What has been described so far reflects the impact of the economic rise of China in the 
current context: the imbalance in U.S.–China economic relations and the missing political lib-
eralization in China constitute a crisis through which the discourse becomes dislocated and 
the identity or self-image of the U.S. is blocked. The dislocation occurs because the LTH can-
not explain two major developments: first, the emergence of China as an economic power, 
which despite considerable economic liberalization is still a single-party state, and second, 
the fact that the U.S. finds itself in an—from the “liberal” perspective—inadequate position 
concerning their trade imbalance and indebtedness vis-à-vis China. Thus their identity as the 
vanguard of the LTH is challenged or blocked, leading to the construction of an antagonism 
through the logics of equivalence and difference, where the outside is made responsible for 
the internal lack. In other words, self-identity is maintained or sutured by constructing a cul-
pable “excluded Other”—that is, China as the “unfair currency manipulator.”  
4.3 Restoring “Fairness” through Currency Revaluation: The Empty Signifier 
In order for the differential positions to become equivalent vis-à-vis an excluded outside, the 
construction of an empty signifier needs to take place. In the debates on the Chinese cur-
rency, it is “fairness” that becomes the central empty signifier. Throughout the whole debate 
and within all categories and topics, “fairness” is omnipresent, mostly articulated in its nega-
tive form with respect to China, which is designated as “unfair” in almost every speech ana-
lyzed and in nearly every bill introduced. Moreover, the other notions used in relation to 
China such as “manipulation,” “cheating,” “artificial undervaluation,” “misalignment,” “dis-
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tortion,” “not playing by the rules,” “illegal and unethical,” etc., all carry unfairness in their 
meaning. The prevalent argument is that China is gaining an unfair trading advantage be-
cause of its currency manipulation (e.g. C.R. 2007e: H10197). From the 25 China bills intro-
duced in Congress between 2003 and 2005, 20 allege an unfair Chinese trade advantage from 
the undervalued currency (Hufbauer/Wong/Sheth 2006: 15). In terms of “fairness,” all the 
nominations for China, like “Communist regime,” “non-market economy,” “granddaddy of 
trade deficits,” “corrupt dictatorship,” etc., come to signify unfairness, whereas the Ameri-
cans—being “hardworking,” “patriotic,” “non-protectionist,” and “believers in free trade”—
become the fair players suffering from the Chinese policies. In Laclau’s sense, the differences 
become equivalent via the empty signifier. Hence the U.S. and its policies are designated as 
vanguards of fair trade (C.R. 2004c: S 8188, C.R. 2005c: S3474) and fair competition (C.R. 
2005f: E921) in speeches held under the topic of, for example, “freedom and fair trade” (C.R. 
2008c: H2076). Moreover, the envisaged congressional measures to counter the Chinese pol-
icy are called the “Fair Currency Enforcement Act of 2003” (C.R. 2003a: S1592 IS), the “Fair 
Currency Practices Act of 2005” (C.R. 2005d: S4872) and the “Fair Currency Act of 2007” (C.R. 
2007f: HR782). One of the bills introduced during the 110th Congress has a section called “Ac-
tion to Achieve Fair Currency” (C.R. 2008b: S2813).  
The ubiquitous presence of “unfair” in relation to “fair” in my eyes points to a literal 
emptiness of the empty signifier, making it present as a signifier of lack through the articula-
tion of its counterpart, and thus further emphasizing its absent presence (cf. Laclau 2007: 44). 
Through the major lines and topics of argumentation and perspectivation, the current situa-
tion in the U.S. is seen as lacking conditions of “fairness”—mostly with respect to fair 
trade—and in consequence lacking a positive trade balance, lacking growth and stability in 
the labor market in general, and in business and the manufacturing sector in particular. All 
this is leading to the lack of overall global performance and to the lowered standing of the 
U.S. The universal remedy against all these lacks, the restoring of “fairness,” is seen in the 
revaluation of the Chinese currency, thus it serves as the nodal point around which the ar-
gumentation intended to fill the empty signifier is ordered. The filling of the empty signifier 
is aimed for through a hegemonic articulation, by which one particular becomes the signifier 
for a universal (cf. Laclau 2007: 43), meaning here that a specific demand becomes the rem-
edy for abolishing the common lack. Therefore, the expected or alleged consequence of a re-
valuation is predicted to resolve all the economic problems of the U.S., to bring about the re-
establishment of its economic strength, which in turn would restore its leading position in 
line with the LTH. 
The attempt to hegemonize the China discourse with respect to the currency issue finds 
its expression in the concrete actions demanded by the U.S. government, visible in the China 
bills introduced in Congress. In their aim to invoke measures to push China to revaluate, the 
“currency manipulation” in these bills is clearly articulated as the reason for the loss of jobs 
in the manufacturing sector, as well as for the trade deficit in manufactured goods, the unfair 
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trade advantage and the trade surplus of China in general (C.R. 2005a: S295IS). The “artificial 
undervaluation” is said to account for a subsidization of China’s exports, a virtual tariff on 
foreign imports, and significant job losses and harm for U.S. businesses in general (C.R. 
2007c: HR1002). Moreover, it is claimed that the effect of a “free currency” would be more 
than twice as large as the effect of eliminating every tariff that China imposes on U.S. goods 
(C.R. 2007a: HR321). The bills also aim to expand the influence of the Congress via the re-
spective committees—like the Committees for Finance and Banking in both chambers—vis-à-
vis the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Trade Representative, and last but not least, 
the president (cf. Hufbauer/Wong/Sheth 2006: 2; Hufbauer/Brunel 2007: 13). Finally, in the 
bipartisan letter of March 2010, taking action against Chinese currency manipulation is ar-
ticulated as imperative to achieve the growth and recovery of the U.S. economy, as “the im-
pact of China’s currency manipulation on the U.S. economy cannot be overstated.” Address-
ing China’s currency manipulation is seen as “critical […] to rebuild[ing] our economy and 
establish[ing] safeguards against future financial crises” (Sandlin 2010: 3). 
Despite these attempts to articulate the revaluation of the Chinese currency as a cure-all, 
and although Congress is in agreement internally about the objective of achieving a sharp 
appreciation of the renminbi (cf. Hufbauer/Brunel 2007: 2), the question of a possibly failed 
trade policy, that in consequence challenges the LTH itself, remains on the agenda. The only 
way to overcome this internal difference is to further intensify all categories in order to im-
pose not only the currency manipulation, but also the “evilness” of China over the doubts 
about the United States’ own policy. Therefore, China is articulated as the excluded Other (cf. 
Campbell 1998: 64). 
4.4 “Evil Empire” vs. “Leading Nation:” Constructing the Excluded Other  
through Intensification16 
The intensification of the previous categories of nomination, predication, argumentation, and 
perspectivation basically leads to sharpening the Self/Other opposition by expanding its sig-
nificance and impact to a wider range beyond the world economy in particular, and time and 
space in general, namely by referring to the global scene and global history. This becomes 
apparent in the following statement: “The bottom line with this whole situation is who is go-
ing to lead the world in the 21st century? If you want it to be the United States of America, we 
better use this window of opportunity to play tough with the Chinese, to tell them to fix their 
currency manipulation or face the consequences” (C.R. 2005e: H3105). To emphasize the ar-
gument, the U.S. is articulated as the “only hope in the world. We must stand strong. Democ-
racy works if we work at it. We must stand together, and this has been the way it has been for 
                                                 
16  The category of mitigation rarely plays a role in the debates, as the main tendency is headed towards the he-
gemonization of the currency debate. The voices pointing to the “problem at home” (the possible domestic 
causes for the current problems of the U.S. economy) are in a minority position. 
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250 years. There would be no hope for anyone in the world today or in the past 150 years 
who longed for freedom, who suffered under tyranny. They would have no hope except for 
the courage and conviction of the United States of America” (C.R. 2009b: H11106).  
All that follows as “intensification,” I categorize as an attempt to preserve the American 
self-image in light of the LTH. Therefore, China is described as being opposed not only to the 
U.S. but to the whole “free world” and thus—via the logic of difference—extending the 
common ground the U.S. is standing on as a proponent of the LTH. At the same time, China 
is constructed as “the simply excluded” and as “the signifier of pure threat” (cf. Laclau 2007: 
38f.). So although it might be argued that the U.S. through its free trade policy bears some re-
sponsibility for the asymmetric economic situation between itself and China, this is suppos-
edly outweighed by the effects of the “evilness” of China, currency manipulation being only 
“the greatest of all its evils standing up front” (C.R. 2003b: H10065). Accordingly, it is argued 
that the free trade policy has not worked because of “an insidious manipulation of our sys-
tem by a foreign power” (C.R. 2009b: H11105). In this respect, the Chinese government is de-
scribed as “a loathsome tyranny, a dictatorship, a dictatorial clique that has enslaved [its] 
own population, intent not just in controlling China but also in dominating the rest of the 
planet” (C.R. 2009b: H11104). Although “you can see which economic system won the Cold 
War, [as] this Russian enclave [in Beijing] sells furs, not ideas” (C.R. 2005i: S7391), the rise of 
China is seen as “one of the most significant developments of the 21st century” (C.R. 2005j: 
H6659). Therefore “there are implications to our unbalanced trading relationship with China 
that may be grimmer than the impact it is having on the U.S. and world economy. Those im-
plications involve China’s geopolitical ambitions, which are clearly less benign than propo-
nents of unbridled U.S.–Chinese trade would want us to believe […]. [A]s the magnitude of 
China’s economy grows, so will its geopolitical will” (C.R. 2005h: E1278). This perspective is 
expressed through one of the most intensified arguments on China’s overall role as the “evil 
Other,” pointing also to the alleged worldwide consequences: “But when the question comes 
as to who will lead the world in the 21st century, will it be the Chinese? Will it be a Commu-
nist regime that is currently manipulating their currency? Will it be a Communist regime that 
is spending mass amounts on their military budget? Is it the Communist regime that has no 
concern for worker rights? Is it the Communist regime that has no concern for the environ-
ment? Is it the Communist regime that has no concern for human rights? Is it going to be the 
Communist regime that has no concern for religious freedom? Is it going to be the Commu-
nist regime that will promote and implement a policy of forced abortions on their own citi-
zens? Or will it be the U.S.” (C.R. 2005e: H3104)? 
On the other side, America is depicted as “a great promise. Ours is the leading nation. 
We live in the pre-eminent country on earth. Americans have every reason to believe that Di-
vine Providence has smiled on us and our Nation. […] America is the greatest power of our 
time. But our lease on greatness is no more certain than those of the great powers of the past. 
We, no more than they, cannot maintain our leadership of the world without effort” (C.R. 
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2005i: S7391). Because China could still prevail, due to the influence of the advocates of the 
“one-way free trade” referred to earlier, “it would be ironic that because of our hunger [for 
market access], [the ones] who brings us to our feet [are] the communists, not because of 
their guns, weapons, and power but because they understood the capitalist system so well 
that they defeated the strongest capitalistic country that God has ever seen” (C.R. 2004e: 
H9708). Thus it is argued that like “spending billions of dollars during the Cold War to pro-
hibit the spreading of communism[, we] need to show similar strength when it comes to 
standing up against China’s communist dictatorship that trades unfairly, oppresses its peo-
ple, and bleeds our economy dry” (C.R. 2004a: S4425).  
This again implies dealing with the differential positions, or opponents of a tougher 
China policy, within Congress. For that reason, the consequences of the U.S. trade policy are 
articulated as having caused a threat to national security, an extreme example being the fol-
lowing quote: “Our country has been a factor in building the Chinese economy into a mon-
strous threat […]. […W]e have built China from a relatively backwards economy into a 
Frankenstein monster [… ,] a country that has had no political liberalization, no political re-
form of their dictatorial system and a country […] that is also engaged in rebuilding its mili-
tary. Now this Frankenstein monster is slowly turning on its creator, turning on us” (C.R. 
2005b: H11105). This is ostensibly the case because even the events of 1989 were not leading 
to a long-term change in trade policy as it is argued that “for 20 years we have let the policies 
that we put in place to encourage democratization stay in place even as these brutal Chinese 
dictators consolidated their hold. All along, the dictatorship has been strengthened by its po-
sition and strengthened in its position exploiting America’s wealth and technology, which we 
have heaped upon them even after Tiananmen Square. We strengthened them at our ex-
pense” (C.R. 2010b: H1158). And this reputedly has to do with the LTH, as again expressed 
quite intensely in the following quote: “If there is one thing that liberals like even better than 
stopping man-made global warming, it is world peace. […] The promise that there would be 
a liberalization in China because they are having more interaction with us, it is what I call the 
‘hug a Nazi, make a liberal’ theory, and it hasn’t worked. There has been no liberalization. We 
have created a Frankenstein monster that now threatens us militarily […]. We are now vul-
nerable to a corrupt dictatorship in Beijing” (C.R. 2010b: H1159).  
Accordingly, the only chance for overcoming this situation purportedly lies in the poten-
tial of the U.S.: “Since the end of the Cold War, we’ve made some very bad mistakes after the 
fall of communism. [… L]et’s create a new alliance in this world that will serve the interest of 
peace, prosperity, and freedom for our people and all the peoples of the world” (C.R. 2009b: 
H11106). To emphasize the special role of the U.S., a parallel to history is drawn again, to 
“the great generation of Americans [that] stepped forward and saved the world from Nazism 
and saved the world from communism and saved the world from fanatics who murder and 
terrorize decent people throughout the world. […W]e have to reach out to those people 
throughout the world and provide leadership as an example. That is what this fight is about. 
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The patriots will win because we are doing so for the cause of all freedom and humanity” 
(C.R. 2010b: H1161). And despite the problems with trade policy, the economic premises are 
in principle still taken to be the right ones: “Since World War I, there has been no greater ad-
vocate for free markets around the world than America. America has much to gain in a world 
of free markets […]. Everyone can be better off” (C.R. 2005i: S7393). But again, the problem 
lies with China and other “Others” not playing by the rules: “We don’t need free trade or to 
be in a binding relationship with those type of regimes, and we don’t need to be controlled 
by a global trading establishment that will result from all of this planetary organization of 
commerce. And you can bet that that global trading establishment, the systems that will be 
set up, will be eventually dramatically influenced, if not dominated, by nefarious regimes 
and self-enriching elites […]. This, the WTO […] will be and is becoming more like the U.N. 
The U.N., which was a theoretical dream but in reality, a nightmare for free and democratic 
peoples. The U.N. is an organization that gives China, the world’s worst human rights 
abuser, a veto” (C.R. 2010b: H1158).  
The aim behind these intensifications is to not completely discard the belief in and the 
practice of free trade policy, but to make China responsible for its failure. 
5 Conclusion 
My aim in this paper was to shed light on the congressional discourse on the Chinese cur-
rency in a way that goes beyond the more common economic perspective, which, as I ar-
gued, is alone not sufficient to understand either the intensity and duration of the discourse, 
or its significance with regard to the concrete policies Congress proposes. DT provides the 
analytical framework for a systematic analysis of the Congressional Record, while its en-
hancement with linguistic categories for the analysis of political rhetoric proposes a method 
for applying the framework in an empirical case. 
Bringing together framework, method, and case, the debates described reflect what La-
clau calls the logics of equivalence and difference, the only manner that an antagonism con-
structed in reaction to a dislocation, which leads to the blockade of identity, can be discur-
sively articulated. The Self and the Other—the United States and China—are constituted 
through nominations and predications that are linked to a chain of equivalences that serves 
to construct—or in this case, preserve—the self-identity as a proponent of the LTH by refer-
ring to an external “Chinese Other” whose characteristics are opposed to each quality that 
makes up the “American Self.” “The Other” has to be articulated as more than just different, 
as its difference has to be commonly opposed by the differential positions within “the Self” 
in order to make them equivalent in their common antagonism vis-à-vis “the Other.” This 
happens through the creation of empty signifiers with argumentation and perspectivation. 
The main lines of argumentation are that China is cheating and being unfair because of the 
manipulation of its currency as a sole basis of its competitiveness. The other argument is that 
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because it is communist, China is not willing to play by the rules of free markets. As a conse-
quence, the U.S. argues from the perspective of a victim of Chinese policies that have caused 
all their major economic problems and have led to the significant deficit in terms of trade and 
the indebtedness to China. In this context, the communist argument becomes one related to 
differing values, as a major problem is seen in illiberal China being the main creditor of the 
U.S., the vanguard of liberalism. This perspective leads to the central crisis, the core of the 
dislocation: the questioning of the LTH as the driving force behind U.S. trade policy towards 
China. It is argued that the policy of engaging China in free trade has not led to the political 
liberalization promised for example by those who advocated granting PNTR to China. Not 
only China’s currency manipulation but also “America’s economic elite” as the advocates of 
free trade are made responsible for the current economic situation of the U.S.  
Throughout the lines of argumentation and perspectivation, “fairness” becomes the 
empty signifier that does not carry a particular meaning, as it simply designates the presence 
of its absence; it accounts for all the different characteristics of the U.S. in their equivalent 
opposition to the “unfairness” of China. The differential positions collapse into the chain of 
equivalence, or are emptied of their differential character. The empty signifier in this case is 
literally empty, as “fairness” is not even articulated as often as its counterpart “unfairness.” 
The “unfairness” is present in all the nominations and predications used for China, espe-
cially in the purported currency manipulation. In the attempt to fill the empty signifier by 
designating the universal remedy to restore “fairness,” a hegemonic articulation takes place 
around the nodal point of “currency revaluation” that is presented as the key to solving all 
the economic problems of the U.S. Given the prevailing uncertainties within Congress about 
the effects of U.S. trade policy that seems not to have worked properly with respect to China 
so far, the whole debate is intensified by designating China as an “evil empire,” the excluded 
Other par excellence. The articulation of China’s evilness is intended to outweigh the last 
possible doubts on the ultimate validity of the LTH and give Congress the argumentative 
force to push the administration to take action against the Chinese currency policy through 
legislative measures. 
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